Forensic evaluation: a strategy for and results of an impact evaluation of a universal labor market program - the Swedish Activity Guarantee by Delander, Lennart
www.ssoar.info
Forensic evaluation: a strategy for and results of
an impact evaluation of a universal labor market
program - the Swedish Activity Guarantee
Delander, Lennart; Månsson, Jonas
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Delander, L. M. J. (2007). Forensic evaluation: a strategy for and results of an impact evaluation of a universal
labor market program - the Swedish Activity Guarantee. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für
Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Arbeit, Sozialstruktur und Sozialstaat, Abteilung Arbeitsmarktpolitik und
Beschäftigung, 2007-102). Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-233984
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lennart Delander*) 
       Jonas Månsson*) **) 
 
 
Forensic evaluation: 
A strategy for and results of an  
impact evaluation of a universal  
labor market program –  
The Swedish Activity Guarantee 
 
 
 
*) Centre for Labor Market Policy Research 
Växjö University, SE 35195 Växjö, Sweden 
e-mail: lennart.delander@ehv.vxu.se 
**) National Institute for Working Life 
SE 62157 Visby, Sweden 
e-mail: jonas.mansson@arbetslivsinstitutet.se 
 
 
 
January 2007 
ISSN Nr. 1011-9523 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung (WZB) 
Social Science Research Center Berlin 
 
Research Area: 
Employment, Social Structure, and Welfare State 
 
Research Unit: 
Labor Market Policy and Employment 
http://www.wzb.eu/ars/ab/ 
 
 
 
Order no.: SP I 2007-102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
To evaluate the effects of a universal program, i.e. all targeted get access, is as-
sociated with the problem that there are no individuals who represent the hypo-
thetical or counterfactual state of being eligible to the program but not 
participating in it. In this study of a Swedish universal labor market program – the 
“Activity Guarantee” – we show how regional differences in the implementation of 
instructions on assignment to the program were utilized to create a control group 
representing the counterfactual state.  
After having gained access to a treatment and a control group, the authors 
evaluated the effects of the program on the probability of leaving unemployment 
and on the duration of unemployment. The effects estimated were statistically 
significant and indicate a clear positive effect of program participation. 
 
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
In dieser Analyse wird das Evaluierungsproblem untersucht, das entsteht, wenn 
die Effekte eines Programms untersucht werden sollen, das einschränkungslos 
für alle Mitglieder einer Zielgruppe gilt. Dann nämlich gibt es nicht mehr die Fälle, 
die den gegenteiligen Zustand repräsentieren, d.h. Anspruchsberechtigte, die 
nicht  an dem Programm teilnehmen. In dieser Studie über ein in diesem Sinne 
universelles Arbeitsmarktprogramm in Schweden mit dem Titel „Aktivitäts-
Garantie“ wird gezeigt, wie regionale Unterschiede bei der Umsetzung der Vor-
schriften zur Zuweisung in das Programm genutzt werden, um eine Kontrollgrup-
pe zu bilden. 
Nachdem der Zugang zu den Daten einer Teilnehmergruppe und einer Kontroll-
gruppe geklärt war, evaluierten die Autoren die Effekte des Programms auf die 
Abgangswahrscheinlichkeit aus und auf die Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit. Die ge-
schätzten Effekte waren statistisch signifikant und belegen einen eindeutig positi-
ven Effekt einer Teilnahme an dem Programm. 
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1.  Introduction 
This article addresses two objectives. Firstly, it aims at showing how regional 
differences in the implementation of a universal labor market program can be 
used to solve the problem of finding a control group to participants of the pro-
gram. The essence of the evaluation problem as regards universal programs is 
that, strictly speaking, there is no group of persons representing the counterfac-
tual state of being qualified for assignment to the program but never taking part in 
it. For politicians and policymakers this creates a problem as regards the possi-
bilities of finding out the effects or efficiency of a program in progress. Universal 
programs are often subjected only to target-oriented evaluations. This is the rea-
son why we were commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Industry, Employ-
ment and Communications to investigate if it was at all possible to conduct an 
effect evaluation of a program called the Activity Guarantee. This is a universal 
labor market program targeted towards unemployed registered at public employ-
ment offices that are or are at the risk of being long-term unemployed. Secondly, 
since we think a way was found out of the dilemma as regards finding an adequa-
te control group, the article also presents results of effect estimations. These 
show the effects of participating in the Activity Guarantee on the probability of 
leaving unemployment and on the duration of unemployment 
In Section 2 there is a brief presentation of the design and objectives of the Activ-
ity Guarantee. Section 3 addresses the question of finding a control group repre-
senting the counterfactual state of not participating in the program. Results of the 
effect evaluation are presented in Section 4. Some reflections on the method to 
solve the evaluation problem and on the results of effect estimations conclude the 
article in Section 5. 
2.  The Activity Guarantee 
In Sweden, payments from the unemployment insurance have a limited duration 
of 300 days. At administrative discretion, benefit eligibility can, however, be pro-
longed for a second, and last period of another 300 days. In 2000, the Activity 
Guarantee was introduced for persons, registered at public employment offices, 
who are or are at the risk of becoming long-term unemployed, including those 
whose unemployment benefit eligibility is about to run out. A person, who ap-
proaches the end of the first unemployment benefit period, will be granted a sec-
ond period of unemployment benefit payments if he or she is considered likely to 
find a job in “the near future”. If this is not the case, the job seeker will be as-
signed to the Activity Guarantee, which is a framework within which all other labor 
market programs can be used. Job seekers who are still unemployed when they 
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have exhausted the second unemployment benefit period are assigned to the 
Activity Guarantee. 
In the Government’s proposal to the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament), the pur-
poses of the activity guarantee were described as follows (Government Bill 
1999/2000:98. Our translation): 
“The activity guarantee is a full-time activity. It has four objectives: Firstly, 
it aims at giving the unemployed an enduring activity until he or she has 
either obtained employment on the open labor market or, as a step on 
the road to such employment, taken up education in the regular educa-
tional system. 
Secondly, an objective of the activity guarantee is to break up the cycling 
between participation in labor market programs and open unemployment. 
To achieve this goal, the unemployed is offered a full-time activity, where 
‘full-time’ is defined in terms of the person’s labor supply, i.e., desired 
working time. Support and stimulation will counteract inactivity. Thereby, 
the program represents an especially active form of labor market policy 
that is characterized by the unemployed having more frequent contacts 
with his or her employment counselor and participating in a more coher-
ent program. 
Thirdly, the activity guarantee will ensure that the unemployed will be ac-
tively looking for job opportunities also when participating in a labor mar-
ket program. This will prevent the development of unemployment habits 
and values where repeated long periods of open unemployment are con-
sidered as a natural course of life. The activity guarantee will also make it 
possible for the Employment Service to prevent improper use of the un-
employment insurance by offering the unemployed a full-time activity. Ac-
tive job search by the unemployed is also fair towards those who have 
work and finance the unemployment insurance. 
A fourth objective of the activity guarantee is to develop methods to make 
it easier to activate those who are hit by the structural problems of 
sparsely-populated areas and by the segregation in big cities where im-
migrants have very low employment rates.”     
Participants in the Activity Guarantee take part either in job search based on or-
ganized activities at the employment office or in regular labor market programs. 
County labor market boards can enter into agreements with municipalities, other 
authorities, and firms regarding activities that can be offered participants of the 
Activity Guarantee. In such cases, the employment office still has the full respon-
sibility for the activities and for monitoring the participants’ job search.  Partici-
pants can only leave the Activity Guarantee by working in a regular job for at 
least six months, by taking up regular education, or by leaving the labor force.1 
To a great extent, participants are recruited from that category of unemployed 
that no longer obtain any job offers, which means that they, in practice, are ex-
                                            
 1 For a more detailed presentation of the program see e.g. Forslund et.al. (2004). 
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cluded from the labor market—they do not belong to the effective supply of labor. 
This means that if the scheme works according to its intentions, the effective 
supply of labor will increase, which can have positive effects on total employment 
(Bellman and Jackman 1996). A leading idea behind the Activity Guarantee is 
that increased intensity of job search will increase the probability of obtaining 
employment (see e.g. van den Berg and van der Klaauw 2001, van den Berg and 
Richardson 2002). 
The Government’s original proposal did not state when, at the latest, unemployed 
were to be assigned to the Activity Guarantee. After its introduction it has, how-
ever, been decided that persons belonging to the target group shall be offered 
participation in the program at the latest after having been registered at an em-
ployment office for 27 months. A person who is entitled to payment from the un-
employment insurance and who refuses, without acceptable reason, to accept an 
offer of participation in the Activity Guarantee will have the amount of unemploy-
ment compensation reduced. In this respect, the rules are the same as for those 
who turn down participation in other labor market policy program. Participants 
obtain either compensation corresponding to the unemployment benefit or con-
tractual wage for such subsidized employment that is being held during the time 
when they are registered in the Activity Guarantee. There is no time limit for par-
ticipation in the Activity Guarantee—according to the Government Bill, participa-
tion will continue “as long as it is warranted from a labor market policy point of 
view”. Apart from being suspended from the program or leaving it voluntarily, a 
participant can leave the Activity Guarantee only by either having had regular 
employment for at least six months2 or having taken up regular education. 
There is no official figure as regards total expenditure on the Activity Guarantee. 
According to an estimate made by the National Audit Office, however, 3.9 billion 
SEK (about 422 million EUR) was spent 2004 on program activities and on in-
come support to participants   (Riksrevisionen 2005, pp 31–32).3 Table 1 shows 
figures on the number of assignments to the Activity Guarantee 2000–2004. To 
give a notion of the relative size of the program, the figures are also related to the 
inflow of unemployed job seekers into the registers of public employment offices 
and to the stock of unemployed job seekers. 
                                            
 2 A person who has obtained regular (unsubsidised) employment will, therefore, remain 
registered in the Activity Guarantee for a period of six months after having taken up 
the job. 
 3 It should be pointed out that this amount does not represent the fiscal opportunity cost 
of the program. A considerable share of the amount represents taxable income sup-
port to participants. In absence of the Activity Guarantee, the unemployed who parti-
cipated in it would have received other types of public assistance.   
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Table 1 Number of persons entering the Activity Guarantee per year and in 
relation to number of new-registered and the average number of 
registered unemployed  
 Number of persons  
assigned to the Activity 
Guarantee during the year 
Percent of number of 
new registered  
unemployed (flow) 
Percent of the average 
number of unemployed 
(stock) 
2000 25 400 3.3 7.4 
2001 24 300 3.8 8.0 
2002 17 100 2.6 5.7 
2003 11 900 1.7 3.8 
2004 16 550 2.1 4.1 
Assignment to the Activity Guarantee was at its peak during the first two years: 
25,400 individuals in 2000 and 24,300 in 2001. This is mainly explained by the 
fact that, when the program started, there was a large stock of unemployed that 
belonged to its target group. During the following years the program was filled up 
with unemployed as they came to be eligible for the program. 
To sum up: The overall objective of the Activity Guarantee is to improve the par-
ticipants’ position on the labor market and to prevent them from being marginal-
ized. The Activity Guarantee distinguishes from other active labor market policy 
programs by intensified placement and counseling activities, increased surveil-
lance of participants’ job search, and an unspecified duration. 
Up to 2000, completion of participation in a labor market policy program provided 
participants with eligibility for a new period of compensation from the unemploy-
ment insurance. As a result, programs partly came to be used to renew unem-
ployment benefit eligibility rather than to strengthen participants’ possibilities on 
the labor market. Since this had negative effects on the results of labor market 
programs, the system was changed and program participation no longer renews 
unemployment benefit eligibility. Instead, the Activity Guarantee, with its indefinite 
duration, provides long-term unemployed with income support. If the Activity 
Guarantee functions as intended, increased placement and counseling services 
can be expected to increase the rate at which individuals leave unemployment. 
The effect of increased monitoring of job search is more ambiguous. If it, in the 
main, concerns formal search and results in a substitution away from informal 
search to formal search, the effect depends on the initial level of search trough 
informal channels.4 
                                            
 4 The effects of counselling and monitoring activities are analyzed in van den Berg and 
van der Klaauw (2001).  
 5
3.  Finding the treatment and the control group 
When making an effect evaluation of a labor market program, the question that 
receives attention is the effect on participants of the program compared to the 
alternative of not participating—on the implicit assumption that there is only one 
program. Then, the evaluation question of interest is: 
Q.1 What is the labor market outcome for program participants rela-
tive to what would have occurred in the absence of the program? 
The core problem is that one and the same person cannot be in two labor market 
states at the same time; the person cannot simultaneously be participating and 
not participating in a program. For a participant, we cannot know the outcome if 
he or she had not participated; there is a counterfactual state that is not observ-
able. 
Furthermore, labor market policy is made up of many different programs. There-
fore, question Q.1 can be reformulated to read: 
Q.2 With a labor market policy consisting of x programs, what is the 
labor market outcome for participants in program P relative to 
what would have occurred in the absence of just that program? 
If program P is the Activity Guarantee, the counterfactual state means being 
qualified for assignment to this program but never taking part in it. The Activity 
Guarantee is, however, a universal labor market policy scheme which is open not 
only to those who, according to judgments by employment office staff, are at risk 
of becoming long-term unemployed but also to all who are long-term unemployed 
and whose unemployment benefit eligibility is about to run out. Participation in the 
Activity Guarantee is thus offered both to persons who risk long-term unemploy-
ment and to persons who are long-term unemployed. There is always the possi-
bility of participating in the program at a later point in time and, therefore, no 
group of persons represents the counterfactual state (cf. Carling and Larsson 
2000). This is the essence of the problem with which we were confronted, when 
commissioned by the Ministry of Industry to investigate the possibilities of making 
an effect evaluation of the Activity Guarantee. 
We therefore started with a broad exploration to see if we could find some varia-
tion in the data regarding participation or no participation in the program that 
might originate from other factors than individual characteristics. When all per-
sons, who are eligible to a program, belong to the factual state and no one be-
longs to the counterfactual state, an obvious solution to the problem just 
mentioned would be to block some of the eligible persons from participating in the 
program. When question Q.2 is of interest, persons who are hindered from par-
ticipating in program P should be allowed to participate in other programs. As a 
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result of blocking, eligible persons who are excluded from participation in the pro-
gram to be evaluated represent the counterfactual state. With this in mind, and 
being well aware of the difficulties to intervene in an on-going program, we ap-
plied our energies to detective work to see if we could find features in the way the 
Activity Guarantee was implemented in the field, which could be supposed to 
produce a result resembling that of blocking.  
What opened up a possibility, was information in a report from the Inspection of 
Unemployment Insurance (IUI) according to which different regional labor market 
boards, and their employment offices, interpreted in different ways the directions 
about when to assign an unemployed job seeker to the Activity Guarantee (IUI 
2004). The report says that: “…there are signs that there exist large differences in 
how different employment offices interpret the rules for assignment to the Activity 
Guarantee…” For a person who has drawn unemployment benefit for 270 days 
(i.e. who is approaching the end of the benefit period), counselors at the em-
ployment office have to evaluate the person’s chances to pass on to either em-
ployment, regular education, employment training or another labor market 
program. If the prospects for such a transition are judged to be good, the em-
ployment office can suggest prolongation of unemployment benefit with a second 
(a final) period of 300 days. If not, the person is to be assigned to the Activity 
Guarantee. In another report, IUI pointed out that the labor market boards in 
some regions interpreted the assignment directions differently and practiced an 
assignment policy which meant that persons, who had exhausted 300 days of 
unemployment benefit payments, almost invariably, at least to a very great ex-
tent, were assigned to the Activity Guarantee. Having been unemployed for 300 
days was, by employment offices in these regions, interpreted as a sign in itself 
of poor prospects for such transitions as mentioned above. In other regions, the 
majority of those who were assigned to the Activity Guarantee had reached the 
end of the second unemployment benefit period, i.e. job seekers who had drawn 
unemployment benefit for 600 days. (IUI 2005) For brevity’s sake, we will in the 
following describe the two principles as “early” and “late assignment” and refer to 
unemployed being subjected to “early” and “late treatment” respectively.  
Three regions were identified as practicing early assignment, whereas employ-
ment offices in 21 regions were classified as offices having late assignment as a 
principle. These findings were the starting point for our identification of a treat-
ment and a control group. In principle, we have identified an early treatment 
group and a late treatment group. Since the variation between the groups is ex-
plained by employment offices practicing different implementation principles, it 
will be independent of the characteristics of the individuals; the variation in the 
data is random. The principle for construction the two groups is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. 
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Figure 1 Illustration of the difference between the control and  
the treatment group 
 
The upper part of Figure 1 illustrates that the treatment and the control group are 
determined by the length in the unemployment insurance. The lower part of the 
figure indicates the different assignment policies. In regions with early treatment, 
most individuals are assigned to the program at the end of the first unemploy-
ment benefit period. Also in these regions, however, some unemployed will be 
assigned later. This can be the case if, for example, the prospects for a person to 
get an employment were judged to be good at the end of the first period, but 
these expectations were not fulfilled. Also in regions with late treatment, there is 
some variation; some persons are assigned early to the program, while most un-
employed are assigned late. 
One problem is that in the regions with early treatment, some selection is made. 
Those with a high probability of leaving unemployment in the near future will not 
be assigned to the Activity Guarantee. A corresponding selection cannot be ap-
plied in regions with late assignment since unemployment benefit can only be 
obtained for a maximum of 600 days—after 600 days, participation in the Activity 
Guarantee is the social assistance alternative at hand for a person who is then 
still unemployed. To be able to construct a treatment and a control group, we 
need to take this selection process into consideration. 
Also in this respect, the information in the report from IUI (2005) could be used. 
On basis of case studies the report identifies several individual characteristics 
that influence the probability of being assigned to the Activity Guarantee. For ex-
ample, people who are close to retirement are less likely to be assigned into the  
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Activity Guarantee. Since the retirement age in Sweden is 65 years, a dummy 
variable was created which indicates if a person is above 61 years of age. An-
other reason to refrain from assigning a person to the program is if his or her em-
ployment office counselor estimates that there are good prospects for the person 
in the near future to get a job or begin to participate in an education. Finally, per-
sons who are part-time unemployed are less likely to be assigned to the guaran-
tee. This information was used to formulate a probit model that predicts the 
probability of being assigned to the Activity Guarantee (see e.g. Maddala 1983). 
The data for the probit estimation consists of information about all individuals in 
regions with early treatment who have had unemployment benefit for 270 days; 
the dependent variable of the probit equation indicates if the individual has been 
or assigned to the Activity Guarantee or not. The results are presented in Table 
2. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
One question raised early in the investigation was if the assignment to the pro-
gram was gender neutral. The fact that the coefficient for Female is statistically 
insignificant indicates that this was the case. According to the instructions for 
assignment to the Activity Guarantee, employment office counselors were to 
judge the likelihood for a person, approaching the end of the unemployment 
compensation period, to leave unemployment. We do not directly have this type 
of information about individuals in our data set and, therefore, we had to con-
struct a proxy-variable. It shows if a person actually has left unemployment within 
120 days after a decision in favor of prolonged payment of unemployment benefit 
was taken. This variable will be highly correlated with the probability of exit from 
unemployment if we assume that employment office counselors have good 
knowledge about their job seeker and are reasonably good at judging the pros-
pects for them to leave unemployment. We are confident that this is a realistic 
assumption. And, in fact, the probit estimation revealed that our proxy variable 
was associated with a strong effect. The probability of being assigned to the Ac-
tivity Guarantee is 24 percentage points lower for a person who has left unem-
ployment within 120 days after the final phase of the unemployment benefit 
period. 
Another characteristic, pointed out by the IUI, is that persons who are close to 
retirement tend to have lower probability of being assigned to the Activity Guaran-
tee. According to our estimation, this probability is 19 percentage points lower for 
unemployed who are at least 62 years old. 
In the population of our study there were persons who were only part-time unem-
ployed.5 Therefore, we have also controlled for whether the individual had an 
employment contract, stipulating part-time work or employment by the hour (tem-  
 
                                            
 5 The regulations of the Swedish unemployment insurance system entitle persons who 
have lost a full-time job, and who work part-time, to partial unemployment benefit as a 
supplement to wage income on condition that they register at an employment office. 
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Table 2 The probability to be assigned to the Activity Guarantee  
in regions with early treatment 
 Marginal effect 
Percentage 
points 
Standard 
Error x 100 
Female 1.06 0.70 
Age 0.23** 0.00 
Age > 61 –18.72** 1.10 
Expected to leave unemployment within 120 days –24.19** 0.80 
Having a part-time or temporary employment contract –32.29** 0.80 
Searches only part-time work 3.20** 0.70 
Search only full-time work –2.64 1.40 
Prepared to move 4.09** 1.00 
Has relevant education –2.54** 0.70 
Has relevant work experience 1.03 0.90 
Upper secondary school 0.04 0.80 
University –5.74** 0.90 
    Immigrant from country in:   
Scandinavia 1.06 2.40 
Western Europe, North America, Oceania 1.09 2.70 
Eastern Europe –0.98 2.00 
Other area 2.26 2.30 
    Handicap   
Impaired vision/hearing –2.69 3.10 
Other physical handicap –0.71 1.00 
Social/mental handicap –1.84 1.80 
Length of time registered at the employment office before 
decision  
(assignment or no assignment to the Activity Guarantee) 0.00 0.00 
Unemployment duration before decision  
(assignment or no assignment to the Activity Guarantee) –0.05** 0.00 
The sum of days registered at the employment office 
during the last 6 years before decision (guarantee or not) –0.01** 0.00 
The sum of number of days in unemployment for the last 
6 years period before decision (assignment or no as-
signment to the Activity Guarantee) 0.02** 0.00 
Number of unemployment spells  –3.15** 0.10 
Number of labor market programs in which the person 
has participated during the last 6 years before decision 
(assignment or no assignment to the Activity Guarantee) 9.61** 0.20 
Decision in 2002 4.76** 1.10 
Decision in 2003 –4.91** 1.10 
Decision in 2004 27.05** 1.10 
 
** significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level.  
Log likelihood = 15 300;  Pseudo R2 =0.22 
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porary employment), at the point of time when decision about assignment to the 
Activity Guarantee was to be taken. The estimate indicates that having an em-
ployment contract, i.e. being part-time unemployed, decreased the probability of 
being assigned to the Activity Guarantee by 32 percentage points.6 
Since the model was to be used for predictions, it should be reasonably good at 
predicting group affiliation. For each individual in our population who was regis-
tered at an employment office practicing early assignment to the Activity Guaran-
tee, the probability to be assigned to the program was computed and compared 
with how it was in reality. The results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Prediction of group affiliation 
 Predicted group  
  Not assigned Assigned Sum 
Not assigned  12 383   (78.2 %)  3 453   (21.8 %) 15 836 Actual 
group Assigned  4 033   (31.8 %)  8 657  (68.2 %) 12 690 
 Sum  16 416  12 110 28 526 
Of the persons in the population of the study [(12 383 + 8 657) : 28 526] × 100 ≅ 
73.8 % were correctly classified , .i.e. more than 7 out of 10. The model classified 
approximately 68 percent of persons who had, and 78 percent of those who had 
not been assigned to the program into the correct group. The distribution of the 
probabilities in intervals of 2 percent (0–2%, 2–4%,…, 98–100%) is shown in Fig-
ure 2.  
In the second step of the identification process, the estimates presented in Table 
2 were used. Persons in regions where late assignment to the program was prac-
ticed were identified after the first unemployment benefit period of 300 days had 
run out. The results in Table 2 were then used to compute the predicted probabil-
ity for these individuals of being assigned to the program. Also these individuals 
were classified into intervals, depending on their computed probability of assign-
ment. On basis of the number of individuals in each interval, in regions where 
early assignment was practiced, we then randomly selected the same number of 
persons from the same probability interval among individuals in regions with late 
assignment.7 At the end of this identification process, we ended up with two 
                                            
 6 Nyberg (2003) points out that only 3.5 percent of the part-time unemployed who reach 
300 full unemployment insurance days have been assigned to the Activity Guarantee. 
 7 This method to create control groups is called propensity score matching and was 
first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). See also Angrist and Krueger 
(1999), Rosenbaum (2002). Applications on Swedish data are found in, for example, 
Johansson and Martinsson (2001) and Delander et al. (2005). It deserves to be men-
tioned that there are other matching methods. Instead of using intervals and random 
selection, one could identify matched pairs with the same or similar values of indivi-
dual probability (see e.g. Delander et al., 2005) or use an average of those individual 
who are most similar (Kernel) (see e.g. Hägglund 2006). For a discussion about diffe-
rent methods see Rosenbaum (2002). 
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groups: one group of 12 690 persons who had been assigned early to the activa-
tion guaranty, in the following occasionally referred to as the treatment group, 
and another group, serving as control, with the same number of persons who had 
the same probability of being assigned to the program after 300 days, but who 
belonged to a region where late assignment was practiced. One way of consider-
ing the two groups is to imagine that if a person, whose first period of unemploy-
ment benefit has come to an end, moves from a late to an early assignment 
region, he or she would be recruited to the Activity Guarantee. In other words, for 
persons in our two groups assignment to the program is independent of individual 
characteristics. 8 
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 8 A potential problem is that the local labor market situation could vary between regi-
ons. One indicator of the local labor market conditions is the unemployment/vacancy 
ratio (U/V-ratio). In our case, the average U/V-ratio for the observation period in regi-
ons with early treatment is 9.4 and in control regions 6.2. In fact, the U/V-ratio is hig-
her for all years in the early treatment regions. This indicates that the local labor 
market conditions are slightly worse in these regions. If local labor market conditions 
significantly affect the outcome, our estimates will be biased downwards, i.e. unde-
restimating the effect. A more rigorous method to control for this, based on local labor 
markets, is presented in Forslund et al. (2005). Unfortunately, we only have two local 
labor market regions that have persons in both the control and the treatment group. 
Therefore it is impossible to use the method proposed, due to too few observations. 
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4.  Evaluation of effects of the program 
The evaluation of the Activity Guarantee consists of two parts, viz. estimates of 
effects on the probability to leave unemployment and on the rate of leaving un-
employment for full-time employment on the open market. The descriptive statis-
tics, which are the same for both analyses, with the exception, of course, of the 
dependent variable, are presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix.9 
Which outcome to be used as dependent variable in the effect estimates is not a 
matter of course. Certainly, the overall objective for the public employment ser-
vice is to help unemployed job seekers to find regular employment. A full-time job 
on the open market is the ultimate destination for its clients. However, according 
to the intentions of the Activity Guarantee, also placements in jobs with wage 
subsidies and transitions to regular education (education that is not financed by 
the employment office) are also counted for as successful outcomes of place-
ment and counseling activities. Regardless of this, however, this study concen-
trates upon transitions to regular, unsubsidized full-time jobs.10 
Effects on the probability to leave unemployment 
At the end of the observation period 2 018 persons  (15.9 percent) in the treat-
ment group had a full time job without subsidy while the corresponding figure in 
the control group was 1 895 persons (14.9 percent). To evaluate the effect on the 
probability to leave unemployment for a full-time job on the open labor market, a 
probit model is used. The results of probit estimates are presented in Table 4. 
According to Table 4, the estimated marginal effect of our evaluation variable is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The fact that the mar-
ginal effect is 1.86 should be interpreted as that a person who received early 
treatment had 1.86 percentage points higher probability to leave unemployment 
for a full-time unsubsidized job compared to those who had to wait longer before 
they were assigned to the Activity Guarantee. The obvious question that presents 
itself is if this is a large or small effect. It is undoubtedly a small effect in terms of 
percentage points. However, it should be kept in mind that the program was tar-
geted toward unemployed job seekers with poor employment prospects. We, 
certainly, do not have any estimate of the initial probability of exit from unem- 
 
                                            
 9 The data system used to register participation in the Activity Guarantee was not in 
working order between August 1and December 31, 2000. The analysis is, therefore, 
based on those who were registered in the Activity Guarantee during the period Ja-
nuary 1, 2001–December 31, 2004 and these job seekers are followed in the register 
until May 31, 2005.  
 10 An analysis has also been performed on basis of the two other definitions of success-
ful transitions and the results point in the same direction.  
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Table 4 The marginal effect of leaving unemployment for  
full time employment 
 
Marginal effect-
Percentage points 
Standard 
error  × 100 
    Evaluation variable   
Early treatment 1.86** 0.44 
    Control variables   
Female –2.45** 0.44 
Age –0.34** 0.02 
Age >61 –10.54** 0.58 
Searching only full-time employment 0.62 0.45 
Searching only part-time employment –0.57 1.12 
Prepared to move 0.12 0.57 
Relevant education 3.27** 0.45 
Relevant work experience 0.28 0.58 
    Education   
Upper secondary school 2.66** 0.54 
University 4.83** 0.73 
    Immigrant from   
Nordic country 2.91 1.63 
Western Europe, North America, and Oceania –3.03 1.63 
Eastern Europe 0.17 1.40 
Other area –1.41 1.11 
    Handicap   
Impaired vision/hearing –9.21** 1.11 
Other physical handicap –6.47** 0.52 
Social/mental handicap –10.43** 0.53 
The situation before entering the Activity Guaran-
tee or obtaining prolonged unemployment benefit   
The person was only registered as unemployed 1.10* 0.45 
Sum of the number of registered days at the em-
ployment office during the last 6 years 0.00** 0.00 
Sum of the number of days in unemployment during 
the last 6 years 0.00** 0.00 
Sum of number of times registered as unemployed 
during the last 6 years 0.16* 0.08 
Number of labor market programs during the last 6 
years  –0.39** 0.13 
Number of changes of job seeker category at the 
employment office during the last 6 years –0.75** 0.06 
    Year   
2002 –3.20** 0.57 
2003 –5.82** 0.53 
2004 –10.66** 0.54 
 
** significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level.  
LL=9 868, Pseudo R2 =0.09 
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Table 5  Cox-regressions regarding transitions to full-time employment 
 Coefficient β Standard 
Error 
Exp(β) 
    Evaluation variable    
Early treatment 0.193** 0.034 1.212** 
    Control variables    
Female –0.179** 0.034 0.836** 
Age –0.026** 0.002 0.974** 
Age >61 –1.608** 0.159 0.200** 
Searching only full-time employment 0.019 0.034 1.019 
Searching only part-time employment –0.067 0.099 0.935 
Prepared to move –0.018 0.043 0.982 
Relevant education 0.274** 0.037 1.316** 
Relevant work experience –0.008 0.043 0.992 
    Education    
Upper secondary school 0.218** 0.044 1.244** 
University 0.388** 0.050 1.475** 
    Immigrant from    
Nordic country 0.176 0.107 1.193 
Western Europe, North America, and Oceania –0.248 0.159 0.780 
Eastern Europe 0.014 0.104 1.014 
Other area –0.072 0.093 0.931 
    Handicap    
Impaired vision/hearing –1.238** 0.290 0.290** 
Other physical handicap –0.636** 0.064 0.530** 
Social/mental handicap –1.410** 0.149 0.244** 
The situation before entering the Activity 
Guarantee or obtaining prolonged unem-
ployment benefit    
The person was only registered as unem-
ployed 0.094** 0.036 1.098** 
Sum of the number of registered days at the 
employment office during the last 6 years 0.000** 0.000 1.000** 
Sum of the number of days in unemployment 
during the last 6 years 0.000** 0.000 1.000** 
Sum of number of times registered as unem-
ployed during the last 6 years 0.007 0.006 1.007 
Number of labor market programs during the 
last 6 years  –0.029** 0.011 0.972** 
Number of changes of job seeker category at 
the employment office during the last 6 years –0.075** 0.005 0.928** 
    Year    
2002 0.419** 0.054 1.521** 
2003 0.930** 0.062 2.536** 
2004 1.980** 0.066 7.245** 
 
** significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level.  
LL = 34 550 2. . 27 3726d fχ = =  
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ployment but if, for example, the probability of entering full time employment at a 
given point of time was only 5 percent initially, it would as an effect of early treat-
ment rise to 6.86 percent, i.e. an increase of 37.2 percent. In that case, the esti-
mated effect could be considered quite large. 
Effects on the duration of unemployment 
To investigate the effects on unemployment duration, a Cox-proportional hazard 
model was used (see e.g. Yamaguchi 1991). The censoring in the model occurs 
at the end of the observation period, i.e. job seekers in our population who have 
not received a full time, unsubsidized job at that point of time were treated as 
censored. Results of estimates are presented in Table 5.  
To interpret the coefficients ( β ), we start by computing exp( )β  and thereby get 
a measure of the effect on the probability to leave unemployment. If this com-
puted value is above 1, it indicates a positive effect on the probability to leave 
unemployment for a full-time job without wage subsidy, and a value below 1 indi-
cates a negative effect on this probability. The effect is computed as exp( )β –1 
for positive effects and 1 exp(β− )  for negative effects (see e.g. Blossfeld et al., 
1989). The coefficient for the effect variable is here 0.193, and the effect is there-
fore exp(0.193) 1.212= . This means that an individual who entered the Activity 
guarantee early had 21.2 per cent higher probability of having a full-time, unsub-
sidized job at a given point of time, compared to those who had to wait longer 
before entering this program. To illustrate the results, a survival plot can be used. 
In this case, the term ‘survival’ refers to the probability for a person to stay (sur-
vive) in unemployment at a specific time. In Figure 3, the probability to survive is 
measured along the vertical axis and the duration, in days, of unemployment is 
measured along the horizontal axis. 
Since the survival curve representing those who have been assigned early to the 
Activity Guarantee is situated lower at every number of days, the probability for 
them to have left unemployment is higher. Interpreted the other way, the figure 
shows that at any given length of spell of unemployment, the probability to remain 
unemployed is higher in the comparison group. This indicates a consistent effect 
over time. For example, Figure 3 shows that after 500 days the probability to still 
be unemployed is around 0.9 among those who entered the activity guarantee 
early. The probability to have left unemployment is thus 0.1. Since the effect of 
early treatment was an increase of 22 per cent, the probability associated with 
late assignment is 0.082. That is, the probability to stay in unemployment is 
0.918. After 1 000 days of unemployment the probability to stay in unemployment 
is around 0.7 for the early treatment group and about 0.75 in the late treatment 
group. To get the effects on the number of days, Figure 3 is read the opposite 
way. At a probability of 0.5, the (median) duration of unemployment is 70 days 
shorter in the treatment group than in the comparison group. 
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Figure 3 The probability to stay in unemployment (survive) given the days in 
unemployment between the treatment and the control group 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
The objective of this study has been to demonstrate a methodology for estimating 
effects of a universal labor market policy program. In the case of the Swedish 
Activity Guarantee for hard-to-place unemployed job seekers, it was observed 
that employment offices in different regions applied differing principles regarding 
after how long duration of unemployment job seekers were referred to this pro-
gram. Carefully looking into how the program was implemented by different em-
ployment offices disclosed a possibility of identifying a treatment and a control 
group, because offices in some regions systematically offered treatment, i.e. par-
ticipation in the program, later during the unemployment period than offices in 
other regions. A more general interpretation of our procedure is that differences 
as regards implementation can make it possible to estimate effects also of uni-
versal programs, programs which in principle are open to all job seekers. How-
ever, the study also demonstrates that our approach can be very data intensive. 
Moreover, in the evaluation of the Activity Guarantee, some assumptions had to 
be made. For example, with the methodology used it was not possible to control 
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for local labor market conditions. This may, however, not have had an effect on 
the results obtained, since there were no indications of influential differences in 
this respect between regions where employment offices applied early assignment 
to the program and the other regions. If there had been large variations between 
regions, our result would have been a mix between program and regional effects. 
After 600 days all individuals, who are still unemployed, enter the Activity Guar-
antee. To interpret our results as the total result of participating in the Activity 
Guarantee, it has to be assumed that the effect of participation is the same for 
these newcomers (late treatment) as for those assigned early to the program and 
who have been in it for 300 days. If this is not the case, our results should be 
seen as effects of early participation in the program rather than of all participat-
ing, i.e. rather than as the effect of the program as such. If, however, the said 
assumption regarding effect after 600 days is satisfied, the effect of the program 
is the same as the effect of early treatment. Our estimates indicated favorable 
effects on the probability to leave unemployment for a full-time, unsubsidized job 
and on the duration of unemployment Given that the assumptions stated holds, 
the Activity Guarantee program as such has had positive effects—the labor mar-
ket outcomes for participants in the program have changed in a positive direction 
relative to what would have occurred in the absence of the program.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Descriptive statistics for individuals who have reached 270 unem-
ployment benefit days in regions with early treatment. N = 28 526 
 Percent Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max.
    Dependent variable     
Assigned to the Activity Guarantee 44 %    
    Control variables     
Female 47 %    
Age  44.6 12.57 20 65
Age > 61 12 %    
Expected transition within 120 days 15 %    
Part-time unemployment contract 14 %    
Searching only full-time 6 %    
Searching only part-time 28 %    
Prepared to move 13 %    
Relevant education 66 %    
Relevant work experience 85 %    
    Education     
Upper secondary school 44 %    
University degree 25 %    
    Immigrated from     
Nordic 2 %    
West European, North America and Oceania  1 %    
East Europe 3 %    
Other 2 %    
    Handicap registered     
Impaired vision/hearing 1 %    
Other physical disability 12 %    
Social/mental disability 3 %    
   Unemployment history before decision     
Registered time for the period before decision  750 864.12 0 4891
Registered time in unemployment for the pe-
riod before decision 
  
127 
 
185.09 
 
0 1784
Sum of number of registered days at the em-
ployment office the last 6 years before decision
  
1342 
 
580.31 
 
13 2190
Sum of number of days in unemployment the 
last 6 years before decision 
  
738 
 
367.09 
 
0 2332
Number of unemployment spells the last 6 
years 
 7.1 4.14 0 38
Number of Labor market programs the last 6 
years 
 2.9 2.55 0 18
    Year for decision     
Decision 2001 19 %    
Decision 2002 18 %    
Decision 2003 30 %    
Decision 2004 33 %    
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Table A.2 Descriptive statistics for the population used in the probit and the 
Cox hazard regression in the evaluation. N=25 380 
 Percent Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min. Max.
    Control variables    
Female 44 %   
Age  45.11 11.74 20 65
Age > 61 7 %   
Searching only full-time 38 %   
Searching only part-time 5 %   
Prepared to move 16 %   
Relevant education 64 %   
Relevant work experience 85 %   
    Education    
Upper secondary school 47 %   
University degree 21 %   
    Immigrant from    
Nordic 2 %   
West Europe, North America and Oceania 1 %   
East Europe 2 %   
Other 3 %   
    Handicap registered    
Impaired vision/hearing 1 %   
Other physical disability 14 %   
Social/mental disability 4 %   
     Unemployment history before decision    
Unemployed without activities within the em-
ployment office 
 
65 %
  
Sum of number of registered days at the em-
ployment office the last 6 years before decision
 
1460
 
579 
 
0 2 190
Sum of number of days in unemployment the 
last 6 years before decision 
 
798
 
366 
 
0 2 332
Number of unemployment spells the last 6 
years 
 7.71 4.14 0 38
Number of Labor market programs the last 6 
years 
 
3.90
 
2.66 
 
0 18
Number of transitions between measures 
within the employment office the last 6 years 
 
4.46
 
3.89 
 
0 54
    Year for decision    
2001 22 %   
2002 19 %   
2003 19 %   
2004 40 %   
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